Calculative Measures of Organising and Decision-Making in Developing Countries: The Case of a Quasi-Formal Organisation in Ghana by Agyemang, Jacob et al.
1 
 
Calculative Measures of Organising and Decision-Making in Developing Countries: The 




Purpose: This paper examines how a “quasi-formal” organisation in a developing country 
engages in informal means of organising and decision-making through the use of calculative 
measures.   
Methodology: The paper presents a case study of a large-scale indigenous manufacturing 
company in Ghana. Data for the study were collected through the use of semi-structured 
interviews conducted both onsite and off-site, supplemented by informal conversations and 
documentary analysis. Weber’s notions of rationalities and traditionalism informed the 
analysis. 
Findings: The paper advances our knowledge about the practical day-to-day organisation of 
resources and the associated substantive rational calculative measures used for decision-
making in quasi-formal organisations operating in a traditional setting. Instead of formal 
rational organisational mechanisms such as hierarchical organisational structures, production 
planning, labour controls and budgetary practices, the organisational mechanisms are found to 
be shaped by institutional and structural conditions which result from historical, socio-cultural 
and traditional practices of Ghanaian society. These contextual substantive rational calculative 
measures consist of the native lineage system of inheritance, chieftaincy, trust and the power 
concealed within historically established sociocultural practices. 
Originality: This paper is one of a few studies providing evidence of how local and traditional 
social practices contribute to shaping organising and decision-making activities in indigenous 
“quasi-formal” organisations. The paper extends our understanding of the nexus between 
“technical rational” calculative measures and the traditional culture and social practices 
prevailing in sub-Saharan Africa in general, and Ghana in particular.  
 









This paper examines how a large-scale indigenous manufacturing company in Ghana engages 
in informal means of organising and decision-making by using calculative measures, 
illustrating the operation of “quasi-formal” organisations in developing countries. Quasi-
formal organisations are enterprises characterised by a blending between, on the one hand, 
formal rational structures and requirements derived from private sector management practices 
and, on the other hand, traditional socio-cultural practices perpetuating from generation to 
generation (Harriss, 1978; Guha-Khasnobis et al., 2006). While quasi-formal organisations 
may be less widespread in Western countries, they are an important feature of developing 
countries in which traditionalism (Weber, 1948) remains deeply embedded.  Given the 
blending between formal private sector management practices and traditional cultural and 
social practices, it is plausible that formal and informal calculative measures co-exist in such 
organisations, and that these are deployed collectively in organising day-to-day activities and 
decision-making.  
 
Extant accounting work has developed three main strands of research to shed light on the 
functioning of calculative measures in developing countries (Alawattage et al., 2017). The first 
strand of research, represented by scholars such as Uddin (2009) and Uddin and Choudhury 
(2008), has examined management accounting practices within formal structured organisations 
operating in traditional societies. These studies illustrate how the application of accounting 
measures may lead to unintended consequences in societies where Western capitalistic 
structures are underdeveloped. A second strand of research, represented by scholars such as 
Gallhofer and Chew (2000), Walker and Llewellyn (2000), Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe 
(2007), Wickramasinghe and Hopper (2005), Alawattage et al., (2017) and Jayasinghe et al., 
(2020), has investigated the use of particular accounting practices and measurements beyond 
formal structured organisations, in informal settings such as rural and indigenous communities. 
The third strand of research pays attention to the application of private-sector rational 
accounting practices within formalised and bureaucratic public sector entities, predicated upon 
efficiency and effectiveness in improving governance and accountability and imposed at the 
behest of international organisations and development partners, as part of governance and 
accountability reforms.  Scholars such as Wickramasinghe and Hopper (2005), Van Helden 
and Uddin (2016), Guven-Uslu et al., (2020), Hopper et al., (2017) have noted the failure to 
enforce the calculative measures as intended and the inability to engender the expected results 
– themes which recur throughout the studies undertaken in both developed and developing 
country contexts but especially in different developing country settings. 
 
Notwithstanding these rich strands of research, there seems to have been a neglect of quasi-
formal organisations as a site for analysing the organising of day-to-day operations and 
decision-making using calculative measures in developing country contexts  Rarely have 
accounting studies investigated how rational calculative measures might operate in quasi-
formal organisations, despite these being perhaps the most widespread forms of organisations 
in developing country contexts in general and in sub-Sahara in particular (Harriss, 1978; 
Hopper et al., 2009; Guha-Khasnobis et al., 2006). Prior research (see e.g., Miller, 2001; 
Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 2007) urges accounting researchers to examine the 
emergence of and ways in which, calculative measures in quasi-formal organisations shape the 
capacities, power relations and actions of and between individuals. 
 
This study addresses this gap. There are at least two striking reasons why our research setting 
in sub-Saharan Africa is ideal for studying the use of calculative measures within quasi-formal 
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organisations. First, a large number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa have, in recent decades, 
experienced the widespread dissemination of rational technical calculative measures and 
practices, such as Western-centric management accounting and control systems (MACS), at 
the behest of international organisations (Hopper et al., 2017).  Second, traditional cultures and 
social practices have continued to remain influential in mediating the dynamics of 
organisational practices in sub-Saharan Africa (Ntiamoa-Baidu 1991; Appiah-Opoku and 
Hyma 1999; Chenhall, 2003). What is notable, however, is the limited knowledge about the 
nexus between these “technical rational” calculative measures and the traditional cultural and 
social practices that prevail in this region. This knowledge is critical to our understanding of 
the manner in which formal organisations are transformed and operationalised, under the guise 
of quasi-formal organisations, through the use of calculative measures. 
 
Within sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana is a particularly compelling setting for exploring the use of 
calculative measures within quasi-formal organisations. Not only is Ghana an early adopter of 
neoliberal private management practices, which are central to the structural adjustment 
programmes of international development organisations (Rahaman et al., 2007), but 
traditionalism in Ghana has survived in everyday life in various forms, including chieftaincy, 
land ownerships and production (Grier, 1981).  Prior studies have documented the impact of 
the neoliberal agenda on Ghana’s economic development strategy and its consequences on 
society over the last three decades (Rahaman et al., 2007; Tsamenyi, et al., 2010; Alawattage 
and Azure, 2019). Despite this neoliberal agenda, chieftaincy as a traditional Ghanaian 
institution, as well as, some traditional practices (e.g. native tenure system of inheritance), have 
survived the historical, economic and political transformations and their influence pervades the 
fabric of local organisations (Grier, 1979).  
 
Using the case study of a large-scale indigenous manufacturing company, this paper 
empirically investigates how Ghanaian traditional culture and social practices traverse the 
boundaries of indigenous companies, and in turn, create managerial dispositions and 
“substantive rational” organising and decision-making through the use of calculative measures. 
Weberian notions of “traditionalism” and “rationality” (Weber, 1948, 1958, 1961, 1968) have 
enabled us to engender insights into the substantive rational aspects of indigenous quasi-formal 
organisations, thus also making them visible.  
 
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature on the use of calculative 
measures in formal and informal organisational settings with an emphasis on developing 
countries. Section 3 provides a theoretical discussion on the Weberian notions of traditionalism 
and rationality (Weber, 1948, 1958, 1961, 1968) and Weber’s three layers of analyses 
(Colignon and Covaleski, 1991) to provide the basis for analysing the calculative practices of 
the researched company. Section 4 outlines our research methods. The main findings of the 
study are presented in three sections as follows. Section 5 analyses features of the case study 
company and its associated traditional foundations to elaborate on the notion of quasi-formal 
organisations. The next two sections examine the layers of traditionalism and rationality that 
impact the organising and decision-making of the researched company, presenting first the 
external layers (section 6) and then the internal layer of analysis (section 7). Section 8 
concludes, bringing out the empirical, theoretical and policy-related implications of the 





2. Organisational calculative practices literature 
 
Historically, calculative practices have been mainly studied within formal organisations to 
examine the process of labour control and the construction of a new form of “governable 
person” (Miller and O’Leary, 1987; Vollmer, 2003). With the ascendency of interpretative and 
critical research in the last few decades, increasing attention has been devoted to understanding 
the role of calculative practices in the functioning of both organisations and society (Hopwood 
and Miller, 1994; Hopwood, 1983; Miller, 1994, 1998). For instance, how calculative practices 
have enabled formal organisations, to both represent and construct a particular version of 
reality, thereby masquerading the social consequences of their activities over the profits and 
welfare engendered to investors, have been widely discussed in prior work (Hines, 1988; 
Hopwood and Miller, 1994; Vollmer, 2003; Sikka, 2015). Considering the power of calculative 
practices, interpretative and critical accounting researchers have emphasised the importance of 
understanding the emergence of new calculative practices and the way such practices are 
implicated in power dynamics, agency and control in formal organisations as well as in the 
wider society (Covaleski et al., 1996; Miller, 2001; Vollmer, 2003; Lapsley et al., 2020). 
 
In the context of developing countries, existing work shows that different forms of calculative 
measures, mainly management accounting techniques, evolved in formal organisations during 
the 1990s, following market capitalisation emanating from the World Bank and the IMF 
structural adjustment programmes (Hopper et al., 2009, 2017). Implicit within market 
capitalisation lies the ideas of promoting internal efficiency, coordination, control and 
competition, the implementation of which are considered paramount to improve performance 
and profitability. The key calculative measures adopted by formal organisations in developing 
countries include activity-based costing, balanced scorecards, capital budgeting and various 
performance measurement systems (Hopper et al., 2009).  
 
However, Western-led calculative practices anchored in individualism and emphasising 
contracts between agents and principals, are plausibly unsuitable for the collectivist cultures 
that prevail in developing countries. For instance, in their study of Malaysian companies, Tales 
and Sofian (2007) illustrate how various performance-oriented systems introduced to 
companies remained ineffective in replacing the value-based and mixed calculative measures 
that existed beyond budgeting. Similar results, showing how calculative techniques 
incorporated to adhere to market capitalism fail to displace the culturally attuned calculative 
practices, are evident in countries such as India, Brazil and Palestine (Anderson and Lanen, 
1999; Guerreiro et al., 2006; Kattan et al., 2007). Politics and family capitalism appear to be 
additional factors that render certain calculative practices ineffective in formal organisations 
operating in developing countries. In an early study, Hoque and Hopper (1994) demonstrated 
how political interventions in a Bangladeshi jute mill reduced formal calculative practices to 
ritualist roles and used them for gaining external legitimacy. Alawattage and Wickramasinghe 
(2008) discussed the influential role that ethnic politics played in shaping calculative practices 
in a privatised plantation sector in Sri Lanka. Similarly, Uddin (2009) and Uddin and 
Choudhury (2008) illustrated cases of formal organisations in Bangladesh where rational 
calculative measures were used to reinforce family capitalism rather than serving general 
shareholders.  
 
A stream of critical accounting research has explored the use of calculative practices beyond 
formal organisations, focusing on rural and indigenous communities. For instance, in their 
study of a poor rural community in the Sri Lankan village of Kalamatiya, Jayasinghe and 
Wickramsinghe (2007) demonstrate how the community was engaged in certain calculative 
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practices, and how these practices were embedded in a “total institution”, defined in terms of 
the relations of production. Similarly, Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe (2011) discuss the 
unintended consequences when the calculative logic of development accounting, prescribing a 
neoliberal resource allocation mechanism (claiming rural empowerment, participation, local 
accountability and performance evaluation), encountered the rural cultural-political logic. This 
resulted in the emergence of certain idiosyncrasies in resource allocation mechanisms, the 
outcome of which was the reconstitution of mundane calculative practices and the reproduction 
of rural poverty. Additionally, Alawattage (2011) shows how the presence of calculative and 
control practices has mediated the field-specific organisation of capital in a Sri Lankan gem 
mining company and performed interrelated but distinct functions of cognition, communication 
and domination.  Overall, calculative practices embedded in informal settings tend to survive 
from generation to generation. Such is evident in Jayasinghe and Thomas’s (2009) work, in 
which the authors delineate how one Sri Lankan local community preserved their indigenous 
calculative practices over many years, despite an ascendency in the literacy levels of 
community members and external pressures for change. 
 
Extant critical accounting research discussing calculative practices in developing countries is 
overwhelmingly focused on public sector settings. The adoption of certain Western-led 
calculative measures by these countries, for instance accrual accounting and participatory 
budgeting, predicated on an underlying rhetoric of improved governance and accountability, 
have been a key focus of these studies (Rahaman, 2010; Val Helden and Uddin, 2016; 
Alawattage and Azure, 2019; Hopper et al., 2017). The findings of such studies are consistent 
in illustrating how such Western-led calculative measures have failed to appreciate the specific 
local, cultural and contextual factors with significant unintended consequences. While some 
studies demonstrate how such calculative measures have remained ineffective in practice and 
are merely layered with the existing measures, others emphasise their adverse impacts, such as 
a rise in corruption, patronage politics and neopatrimonialism (Bakre et al., 2017; Goddard and 
Mkasiwa, 2016; Goddard et al., 2016; Nyamori et al., 2017; Jayasinghe et al., 2020). For 
instance, Kuruppu et al. (2016) illustrate how participatory budgeting in a Sri Lankan urban 
council has resulted in political domination and symbolic violence. More recently, Alawattage 
and Azure (2019) have demonstrated the Ghanaian case where the calculative measures 
adopted to promote social accountability have served the interests of international organisations 
rather than the citizenry.  
 
Informal settings in sub-Saharan Africa consist of specific social-cultural and traditional 
practices, which can have a profound impact on formal organisations’ day-to-day operation, 
power dynamics and the functioning of calculative practices. For instance, in their study of a 
multinational subsidiary in Nigeria, Egbe et al. (2012) argue that although management control 
systems are built on formality, these systems tend to operate alongside informal controls. Here, 
informal controls (such as trust) could be more prominent than formal control mechanisms, 
resulting in, for example, members being assigned tasks not based on their abilities and skills 
but on the extent to which they are trusted by their supervisors (Jayasinghe and Thomas, 2009; 
Egbe et al., 2012). However, few accounting studies have investigated how specific calculative 
practices, both rational and traditional, are blended in organising and decision-making in 
formal organisations that operate in indigenous settings. Very few have investigated how these 
practices result in these organisations being transformed into quasi-formal organisations. Our 
article addresses this research gap by investigating a Ghanaian formal organisation operating 
in an indigenous setting. In doing so, we present a novel analysis of the distinctive and 
significant cultural and traditional practices that have important implications for organisational 
structures, production relations and calculative practices in developing countries. 
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3. Weberian notions of rationality and traditionalism  
 
Weber’s work (1948, 1958, 1961, 1968) presents a theoretical basis that is vital in enabling us 
to understand how the organising and calculative decision-making practices functioning inside 
an indigenous organisation are framed by traditional cultures and politics. Weber’s rationalities 
have been used in understanding the role of accounting knowledge and the accounting 
profession in developing capitalism (Chua and Poullaos, 1998; Auyeung and Ivory, 2003). It 
is argued that modern enterprises are characterised by multiple rationalities and that the 
distinction between formal and substantive rationality is analytically useful in generating 
insights into the functioning of certain practices, such as  accounting practices, within 
enterprises (Uddin and Choudhury, 2008; Boudon, 1997; Brouwer, 2002; Mody et al., 2016). 
 
By formal rationality, Weber means the matters of fact to a scientific and technical space of 
life (see also Colignon and Covaleski, 1991). Formal rationality is considered to be value-
neutral and founded on an expectation that the capacity of controlling the world through 
calculations can be developed (Kalberg, 1980; Brubaker, 2013). On the other hand, substantive 
rationality is driven by a conceptual or ideological value and does not work solely as a means-
end calculation of solutions to recurring problems (Aronovitch, 2012). Actions stemming from 
substantive rationality are, rather, guided by strong, moral and non-consequentialist reasons, 
which require no further justification. Uddin and Choudhury (2008) point out that Weber’s 
work is yet to be fully exploited by accounting researchers to provide a critical and political 
basis for understanding accounting practices, in both traditional and capitalist societies. In this 
regard, our study offers an important addition to extant work, shedding light on accounting and 
traditionalism. 
 
Elaborating on Weber’s work, Colignon and Covaleski (1991) argue that three layers of 
analysis are paramount in generating a detailed understanding of organisational practices, 
including accounting practices. The three layers are the nature of the institutional and structural 
conditions (an external layer), the cultural and historical context (an external layer) and the 
organisational setting (internal layer). The first layer of analysis identifies the society as being 
replete with structural and institutional characteristics which create the conditions required for 
rational decision-making in organisations, such as profitability, appropriation of all physical 
means of production, freedom of the market, free labour, rational technology, calculable law 
and commercialisation of economic law (Weber, 1958). To Weber, these conditions are 
important in shaping capitalistic development. Weber envisages ideal-typical capitalism as 
having been only partially realised in the Western industrial revolutions of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. That said, as Uddin (2009) notes, the partial realisation of ideal-type 
capitalism was (and is) the result of the interactions between structural and institutional 
conditions and the socio-political, cultural and historical contexts, i.e. the two external layers 
of Weberian analysis. 
 
The second external layer of Weberian analysis (Colignon and Covaleski, 1991) identifies 
specific cultural and historical features of society. These features have the propensity to 
facilitate or obstruct the full development of rational capitalism, the modern enterprise and 
rational capital accounting (Weber, 1948). Weber also recognised that capitalism has 
traditional forms, evident in the West, e.g. Germany until the eighteenth century, and which 
prevail even now in developing countries. In his work on Indian societies, Weber (1948) also 
mentions the destruction of intra-community relations (Demiurgie) and the elevation of an 
inter-community division of labour under patrimonial political domination (e.g. the caste 
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system) as being a cause of the rise of traditional societies. McLane (1993) also notes that the 
promotion of an inter-community division of labour was an aspect of traditionalism, 
contradicting the money economy and capitalism as envisaged in the West, and thereby 
prevented the same from flourishing. These traditional forms of capitalism involve recognising 
and preserving the historically reproduced values, morality, norms and practices of specific 
social groups and communities, which leads to “conservatism in economic activities” (Weber, 
1948). Weber claims that economic activities become more conservative when connected with 
traditional morality, and he explains how the subsequent effects of the increasing 
rationalisation of human life eventually traps individuals in an “iron-cage” of rule-based, 
rational controls. In Weber’s description, “old leisurely and comfortable attitude toward life” 
is a key feature of traditionalism and the old form of labour in workplaces (Weber, 1948). The 
traditional form of labour is confined to earning just enough money to maintain a comfortable 
and respectable lifestyle and have a minimalist life, rather than making profits or earning more. 
The partial development of rational capitalism in most developing countries, or the difficulty 
associated with the development of ideal markets, is therefore attributed to traditionalism 
(Weber, 1948; Uddin, 2009), and it is perhaps not surprising that these issues are more 
pronounced in developing countries such as Ghana. 
 
Weber (1958, 1961, 1968) argues that a third, internal, layer of analysis that interacts with the 
first two (external) layers is needed to explore organisational practices. That is, the institutional 
and structural conditions, coupled with the historical and cultural features, serve as the basis 
for situating a specific enterprise over a period of time to analyse its organisational practices. 
Building on Weber’s notion of rationalities, Colignon and Covaleski (1991) discussed 
accounting practices within the modern enterprise, a central feature of which is the existence 
of multiple rationalities. They argue that the existence of multiple rationalities provides the 
basis of conflicts in the enterprise and that the distinction between formal and substantive 
rationality is paramount to understand accounting practices. For instance, it is not surprising 
that rational accounting practices in a traditional society (such as the Ghanaian) may take a 
substantive form which preserves the interests of the family, tribe and clan (Uddin and 
Choudhury, 2008; Jayasinghe et al., 2020), or that the institutions of community (e.g. 
chieftaincy), market and state are intertwined in traditional societies (Dyball et al., 2006).  
 
The foregoing Weberian insights are especially pertinent to our study.  As we shall explore, in 
Ghanaian society, several key elements of traditionalism, including a pure native tenure system 
of inheritance, chieftaincy, control and authority along age lines, familial domination, and 
communality, appear to shape formal calculative practices and the organisation of economic 
resources, particularly, in indigenous organisations (see e.g. Bukari, 2016; Grier, 1979). Thus, 
Ghanaian society is likely to give rise to a substantive rationality of compliance which includes 
organisational practices that result from the dictates of traditional values and interests such as 
trust. Weber’s notions of rationality and traditionalism (1948, 1958, 1961, 1968) therefore have 
much to offer studies into calculative practices and the organisation of economic resources, 
such as in the Ghanaian indigenous owned and managed organisation investigated in this study.   
 
4. Research Methods  
 
The research adopted a case study approach (Yin, 2003) for the data collection. Our research 
setting was a large, quasi-formal indigenous manufacturing company, which we call TimberCo 
Ghana, situated in the “Brong Ahafo” region of Ghana. This company characterises the typical 
indigenous organisational culture in Ghana, articulating both technical-rational calculative 
measures of organising and decision-making, i.e. management accounting technologies, and 
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traditional ideologies and social practices. Data for the study were largely collected through 
the use of semi-structured interviews conducted both onsite and off-site (see Appendix 1), 
supplemented by informal conversations and documentary analysis to give a better insight into 
the interview data (see Appendix 2 for the documents reviewed). Semi-structured interviews 
enabled the generation of an in-depth understanding of how the Ghanaian traditional culture 
and social practices have influenced both the functioning of the indigenous company and the 
use of calculative measures, the result of which has been the domination of substantive 
rationality in the organisation and decision-making process. The application of other methods 
such as surveys would have prevented such in-depth understanding of traditionalism and the 
use of calculative measures in indigenous companies. A semi-structured interview guide was 
designed by largely focussing on questions which were dictated by the research themes 
identified through the objectives of this study and the associated theoretical scope based on a 
Weberian framework of traditionalism and rationality (Weber, 1948, 1958, 1961). The 
interview questions covered topics such as: organising and decision-making processes of the 
company; perceptions about the managerial characteristics of the managing director (owner); 
family issues; culture; budgeting; perceptions about the use of accounting; and future 
projections. 
 
Access to the company premises to conduct interviews was facilitated by community leaders 
who were highly respected by the owner of the company. On-site interviews were conducted 
at the company’s premises and off-site interviews were facilitated via Skype and telephone. 
The off-site interviews not only supplemented the findings of those conducted on-site, but also 
helped clarify inconclusive interview data and address any follow up issues. In total, 56 
interviews were conducted, and informants included departmental heads, general employees, 
community members, ex-employees, trade union members and representatives of the Ministry 
of Lands and Natural Resources and the Faculty of Forest Resources Technology (see 
Appendix 1). The general employees interviewed had worked in the company for more than 
five years and had extensive knowledge and experience of the day-to-day working practices. 
The respondents were guaranteed confidentiality and anonymity. The interviews lasted 
between fifty minutes and one and half hours; they were tape recorded and subsequently 
transcribed.  
 
As discussed in the previous section, Weber’s three layers of analysis (the institutional and 
structural conditions - external layer; the historical context - external layer; and the 
organisational context - internal layer), informed the analysis. Data coding followed Miles and 
Huberman’s (2002) three-step data analysis method: data reduction, data presentation and 
conclusion drawing. Accordingly, in order to reduce the interview data, we facilitated a process 
of data selection, simplification and transformation from the field-notes. Various organisational 
practices, such as managerial hierarchisation, production processes, budgetary controls and 
labour controls, were used to generate the “initial codes”. This primary coding was followed 
by the stage of examining the data for: (i) Weberian notions of traditionalism and (ii) two 
distinctive forms of rationalities, technical and substantive; and (iii) calculative measures 
embedded in each of the above-mentioned organisational practices. The later stages of analysis 
constructed summary narratives of the three layers of Weberian analysis, noting how technical 
rationality and traditionalism co-exist, subsume and form new substantive rational (Weber, 
1948, 1958, 1968) calculative measures of organising and decision-making in the researched 
organisation.  In reporting the findings, we first present the features of the case study company 
and its associated traditional foundations, and elaborate the notion of the quasi-formal 
organisation.  Secondly, we examine the external layers of traditionalism and rationality which 
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impact organising and decision-making within the researched company. Finally, we present 
and discuss the internal layer of analysis. 
 
 
5. The quasi-formal organisation: TimberCo Ghana 
 
TimberCo was established in 1997 and had a workforce of over 1500 at the outset of the field 
interviews. It is registered with the Registrar General’s Department (RGD) under the Ministry 
of Justice and Attorney General. TimberCo is also an ‘A’ registered exporter of timber products 
to West African, European Union and North American markets. The company is registered 
with the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA) to ensure adherence to tax obligations. As such, 
TimberCo is required to comply with value added tax (VAT) obligations. TimberCo is also 
obligated to ensure that its employees pay tax on a “pay as you earn” (PAYE) basis. Having 
fulfilled all these requirements, the legal standing of TimberCo is emblematic of a formal 
technical-rational (Weber, 1958, 1961) organisational structure.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
However, in practice, as shown in Figures 1 and 2, the company demonstrates two 
organisational structures. The first (Figure 1) is the formal technical-rational organisational 
structure (largely non-functional, top to bottom), which highlights the chain of command from 
the managing director (owner) to the general employees. This is what is formally demonstrated 
on the company’s information board and is similar to what would normally be included in the 
company registration documents formally submitted to Registrar General’s Department 
(RGD). The second (Figure 2) is the practical (actual) organisational structure which has two 
distinctive chains of command: an owner-manager-informed chain of command and the 
department heads-informed chain of command. The owner-manager-informed chain of 
command is what largely occurs in the day-to-day organisation of the production process.  
 
 [Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
In the formal organisational hierarchy, supposedly, the direct chain of command is initiated by 
the managers and passes on to the general workers via the department heads. However, in 
practice what we call the owner-manager-informed chain of command predominates. Under 
this, there are direct engagements or interactions between the managing director (owner) and 
the general employees as well as the managing director (owner) and the department heads. 
Meanwhile, the engagement between department heads and their supposedly subordinate 
general employees is limited. For instance, the following observation was shared by managerial 
interviewees: 
“This is typically an indigenous-owned company and the management style is sort of 
mixed. The managing director is involved in almost every activity that takes place. He 
can go to the bush (forest); he comes to the floor of the factory. Though he seeks 
technical advice from technicians, his views are final”.  
 
Similarly, a supervisor shed light on the internal managing director (MD)-worker relationships:  
“Workers can go straight to the MD without passing through anyone [i.e. department 
heads] and vice-versa. When the MD is not here, they [employees] will come and see 
either the accountant or the production manager. The MD will also not ask us 




This bypassing of the formal hierarchical structure occurs because in many ways the owner 
does not trust his fellow managerial staff. Instead, he uses some culturally shaped substantive 
rational (Weber, 1948, 1958, 1968; Uddin, 2009) mechanisms driven by the Ghanaian “pure 
native tenure system of inheritance” to construct an alternative form of hierarchisation to 
manage his general employees and managers. As will be subsequently discussed (sections 6 
and 7), examples include: the owner’s use of his immediate family members (e.g. brother) to 
control labour in his absence; the employment and use of people from his own village to gather 
important internal information; and inviting community leaders (elderly clansmen) to advise 
(and hence) control the labour force. These external influences are included in Figure 2.  
 
As per field observations, the activities of the company are then, at least in part, organised and 
controlled under forms of hierarchisation based on the substantive rational (Weber, 1948, 1958, 
1961) measures of the traditional inheritance system that exist within the Ghanaian socio-
cultural contexts. The form of substantive rational hierarchisation that exists within traditional 
practices in Ghana is on the whole neither formal nor formalised. As such, the current ‘written’ 
knowledge of these traditions have resulted from oral recall and transmission of preserved 
textual and cultural knowledge through vocal utterances. With reference to TimberCo, our 
study reveals that the ‘traditional inheritance system’ peculiar to matriliny (as discussed in 
section 6.2), alongside the ‘hierarchisation’, creates some inter-connection between the 
provenance of the company and its calculative measures and control mechanisms. All this 




6. The External Layers: the institutional, structural, cultural and historical contexts  
 
In this section we analyse the institutional and structural context (external layer 1) and specific 
features of traditional culture, history and society (external layer 2) in relation to the timber 
industry of Ghana.  
 
6.1. Rational institutional and structural context of Ghanaian timber industry 
 
The timber industry, which operates under the ambit of the Ministry of Lands and Natural 
Resources, is the fourth largest foreign exchange earner in Ghana after minerals, cocoa and oil 
exports (Bank of Ghana, 2004; Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, 2012). The industry 
comprises primary, secondary and tertiary activities (see Table 1 for the actual activities 
classified under each activity area). According to Ghana’s Forestry Commission (2013), there 
are 328 timber companies with valid timber holdings. These are the companies with 
concessions and timber utilisation contracts (TUCs). Additionally, there are more than 200 
furniture and wood-working enterprises operating throughout the country. The industry’s 
distinctiveness is represented in its employment creation proportion, which surpasses other 
natural resources. It is estimated that about two million people directly earn their livelihoods 
from the timber industry (Gyimah and Dadebo, 2010; Bank of Ghana, 2004).   
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
The performance of the industry has been mixed, but in the past years, both the volume and 
value have registered declines. For instance, timber-related products accounted for about 10% 
of exports between 1990 and 2000, but there has been a considerable decline from 8.1% in 
2005 to only 1.8% in 2011 (Lands and Natural Resources Ministry, 2012). Such a decline is 
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perhaps consistent with a reduction in the area of loggable forest which stood at approximately 
1.6 million hectares in 2013 (Young, 2017).  
 
Initiatives made by the government over the last few years to control the depletion of the 
traditional hardwood species by prohibiting the extraction of several types of unprocessed and 
raw logs have also adversely affected the profitability of the timber industry (Lands and Natural 
Resources Ministry, 2012). The industry has also been hard hit by the structural adjustment 
programmes (SAP) adopted by the government, in compliance with the loan conditionalities 
of the World Bank and the IMF. The SAP has resulted in the promotion of several rational 
capitalist mechanisms in the Ghanaian private sector, including the removal of subsidies and 
price controls, the elimination of trade barriers, the promotion of market competition and 
freedom of movement of labour (Arthur, 2006; Tsamenyi, et al., 2010). As a result, private 
enterprises, including TimberCo, have been left to their fate, with the intent of allowing 
external competitive market forces to dictate the local market.  
 
Historically, legislation underlying timber extraction was enacted in 1906 to control the 
commercial felling of trees, subsequently augmented by the creation of the Forestry 
Department in 1908.  This led to the demarcation and reservation of the forest estate which was 
largely completed in 1939, and a Forest Policy was adopted in 1948 (Adjei, 1994). The 
government’s total control of Ghana’s timber allocation was central to post-independence 
reforms, which also resulted in the re-ordering of the institutional structures and the power 
dynamics of the country. Timber rights were vested in the president and the state on behalf of 
the stools (local chiefs) by virtue of the Concessions Act of 1962. For this reason, felling rights 
on and off forest reserves were granted under the sole prerogative of state-appointed authorities 
(Lund et al., 2012). This provision was altered however, after sections 1 and 4 of the Timber 
Resources Management Act of 1998 (Act 547) (amended in 2002 by Act 617) were put in 
action. Based on this Act, the felling of trees is recognised under the following permit 
categories: Timber Utilisation Contract (TUC); Salvage Permit (SP); Timber Utilisation Permit 
(TUP), Special Permits, Timber Leases and Certificate of Purchase. 
 
A TUC is a written contract signed by the Minister for Lands and Natural Resources and ratified 
by Parliament, granting a timber harvesting right acquired upon “competitive bidding” by 
Ghana Forestry Commission (GFC). Since 2003 the process of issuing TUCs to timber firms 
has been undertaken in the presence of the public, press, the industry and members of 
parliament (Parliamentary Select Committee on Lands and Forestry). The intent is to dispel the 
familiar accusations of collusion, nepotism, cronyism and political favouritism in the allocation 
of timber resources. TUCs typically have a duration of up to 40 years and cover a maximum 
area of 12,500 ha. (Young, 2017). The SP is an administrative permit signed by the Forestry 
Commission to salvage trees from an area undergoing development. To be considered for this, 
the permit needs to be accompanied by the application and an inspection report from the Forest 
Service Division, while the TUP is a small-scale permit to harvest a defined number of trees 
for social or community purposes signed by the Forestry Commission. Timber from these 
permits cannot be sold or exported.  
 
However, the actual practice of bidding for TUCs remains discretionary, subject to secrecy, 
political party affiliation, self-seeking and cronyism, with widespread illegal and criminalised 
chainsaw lumber operations (Hansen and Lund, 2011; Hansen et al., 2012; Lund et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the government’s direct control of private timber companies goes beyond 
concessionary procedures. Specifically, access to foreign markets for timber products is subject 
to the sole dictates of the government. The GFC promotes timber trade by helping timber 
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companies gain access to foreign markets and also creates investment opportunities in the 
timber industry. As a policy requirement, the GFC has been entrusted with ensuring legalised 
lumbering access to markets and sustainability through forest re-plantation. The GFC is also 
responsible for ensuring that timber companies comply with the European Union’s Forest Law 
Enforcement, Governance and Trade and Voluntary Partnership Agreement (FLEGT-VPA). 
The EU’s FLEGT-VPA is part of a sub-global initiative or action, as well as climate mitigating 
policy, of reducing emissions from deforestation, forest degradation as well as serving as a 
mechanism to combat trade in illegal logging (Ochieng et al., 2013).  Compliance with this 
agreement facilitates the smooth exporting of timber products to the European market. 
 
6.2. Historically evolved features of Ghanaian society and culture 
 
This section discusses aspects of the historically established (traditional) culture and social 
practices in Ghana which particularly impact on TimberCo.  We highlight the lineage trail of 
ownership in relation to the case study company and the power of “chiefs”. 
 
6.2.1. Lineage trail of ownership 
 
In Ghana, in common with much of sub-Saharan Africa, land is mainly owned communally 
along ethno-tribal and family lines, with designated traditional authorities responsible for its 
management in their capacity as trustees (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001; Boni, 2005; Aryeetey et 
al., 2007; Boni, 2013; Yeboah and Shaw, 2013). It is largely the responsibility of chiefs to sell 
land under leasehold agreements to interested parties. Land rights and tenure are enshrined in 
a complex legal and customary environment of Ghana (Kasanga, 1998). The customary owners 
(stools, clans, families and tendamba) with allodial title own about 78% of the total land area 
in Ghana, with varying tenure and management systems (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001; Ministry 
of Land and Natural Resources, 2012).  
 
TimberCo Ghana is no exception to the influence of Ghanaian traditional practices. The 
company’s history and ownership are rooted in the traditional matrilineal system of inheritance 
that is associated with the ‘Akan’ in Ghana. The distinctive features of such a system are that 
inheritance and family are along the lines of the mother. That is, a man is strongly related to 
his mother’s brother (wofa) but only weakly related to his father’s brother1. As a result, in 
inheritance, a man’s nephew (sister’s son) (wofase) will have priority over his own son. 
Therefore, uncle-nephew relationships assume a dominant position (La Ferrara and Milazzo, 
2017). Although legislation (the intestate succession law) was promulgated in Ghana in 1985 
to alter this traditional pattern of inheritance, its continuation is witnessed in recent inheritance 
litigations among some families. In effect, the Akan inheritance and succession system 
stipulates that property and status are transferred from the mother’s brother to sister’s son. 
Nonetheless, it is a more complex principle than the usual examples given in anthropological 
explanation. For instance, in some instances, when a man’s brothers are available, a 
consideration of generational seniority stipulates that the line of brothers must be exhausted 
before the right of succession passes down to the next generation (i.e., sister’s son).  
 
This lineage trail is manifested in TimberCo Ghana’s organising of production. For instance, 
the current peri-urban location of the company is a result of the lineage trail linked to 
ownership. Specifically, an uncle-nephew relationship preceded the ushering of the owner 
(nephew) into the timber business. The company’s accountant narrated that: “when the owner’s 




uncle demised, he took over to revamp the company”. Its original location was in the owner’s 
native village, about 15 miles from the current location. The land on which TimberCo was 
initially situated (before being handed over to the nephew) was family land, which was 
managed and controlled by the uncle. After being given the mantle of control, the current owner 
(nephew) changed the name of the company and this led to conflict with extended family 
members. The conflict stemmed from the view that the new name connotes personalisation of 
the company, which in some sense contradicts the cultural lineage characterisation of 
inheritance. In an attempt to resolve this impasse over the years, the owner acquired the present 
site for the company as his ‘own’.  
 
Therefore, the traditional inheritance system still plays a role in the organising and decision-
making of the company, notably the location of the case company. Thus, the existence of such 
traditional narratives corroborates the view that organising economic resources in developing 
countries is not underscored by a mere objective process, but rather norms, cultures and 
histories that define, describe, analyse and contextualise the process.  
 
6.2.2. The royalty payment to “Chiefs”  
 
The incorporation of Ghana’s producers into the expanding worldwide capitalist system did 
not result in the immediate capitalist transformation as assumed by Frank (1969), nor in the 
eventual transformation predicted by Rey (1971) (see e.g. Grier, 1981). This is a recognition 
of the inevitable aspects of local factors which have the propensity to influence the organising 
and the calculative functioning of organisations in Ghana.  One of the most obvious of these 
inevitable local factors are the chiefs, a class of persons who exercise considerable authority 
(Douglas, 1999) and whose rights may (or may not) be considered as arbitrary, irregular, 
domineering and predatory in the enjoyment of their prerogatives. For example, the chiefs may 
interfere with the operations or the organising and the calculative functioning of companies 
within their jurisdictions in Ghana. The essence of this is in the cultural significance of 
chieftaincy: it is not merely that certain individuals are extremely powerful, but also that the 
power associated with these cultural practices is unquestioned.  
 
This aspect of traditionalism significantly impacts the calculative functioning and the 
organising of timber product manufacturing in our case study company. Organising timber 
product manufacture is partly shaped by chiefs’ impetuses in the forms of patronage of social 
and production relations (Alawattage, 2011) that exist between the chiefs (as land owners and 
custodians) and the timber companies (as concession owners). The company’s raw material 
cost composition partly accounts for royalty payments to chiefs, legitimising concessionary 
practices. Additionally, raw material costs include further miscellaneous payments to chiefs in 
instances where rituals (such as libation) are performed before logging activities. Table 2 shows 
timber business royalty payments linked to the chieftaincy institution in Ghana. The table’s 
line items are an indication of the contribution to the chieftaincy institution from the timber 
industry. This highlights the significant economic influence and authority of the chieftaincy 
institution on timber production in Ghana. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Timber concession areas form part of the lands owned (communally) by families and managed 
on their behalf by family heads (elders).  The chief, usually the head of one of the constituent 
lineages, along with the other heads (elders), make up the council that manages the village 
lands. The chief, in council, acts as trustee over allocated and unallocated land. In some 
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communities, unallocated land cannot be cleared before the council grants its permission. 
Lineage membership entitles a person to clear and cultivate as much land as his resources allow. 
Due to the conflict between the land ownership and concession ownership (logging rights), 
timber companies, seeking to access their concessions, are occasionally faced with blockades 
from families. For instance, elders of communities and lineage heads may interrupt the logging 
and carriage process, due to their claim of ownership to concession lands. Such interruptions 
incur costs which, in the case company, is accounted for as part of the raw materials acquisition 
cost.  
 
As just described, the distinctive way of organising raw material resources for production is a 
result of the conflict which emanates from the need for companies to ensure lineage production 
relations. A TUC grants timber companies the legal right to own an allocated forested area for 
logging. However, conflict arises whereby the land occupying the same forested area is owned 
by families, lineages or chiefs. Therefore, although having TUCs from the government was a 
precondition to accessing logs from concessions, the accounts from interviewees highlight that 
the procurement of timber logs is not only charged by relations of and with the central 
government, but by the relations of and with the chiefs and the community. For example, in 
instances where landowners initiate farming activities during the concession period, trees may 
be cleared by farmers which limits the projected raw materials acquisition. Furthermore, 
farmers may resist transporting logs across their land, as stated by a Production Manager: 
 
“But that forest may be somebody’s farm and you have to pull the logs through. The 
guy gets annoyed and the next time your way will be blocked.”  
 
Communally-informed initiatives therefore lie at the very core of traditional timber production 
in Ghana. Part of the communal manifestations of African production relations or social 
arrangements is underlined by a life in which the endowments are regarded as assets of the 
community. As such, popular decisions are the ones geared towards community or individual 
“proportionate” share of such assets. Moreover, it is within the consciousness of Ghanaians 
that the capacity of individuals and communities to organise or disorganise resistance is tenable 
– an example of which is the resistance in the form of the timber company having to meet or 
conform to further demands by chiefs, individuals or communities before being allowed to 
extract timber logs. The sense of conflict and resistance is linked to the post-independence, 
constitutional mandate of entrusting the “ownership”, management or the administration of 
forests resources, among other landed properties, to the state. This agitated the chiefs, 
communities and some families who in turn have used their status as a significant indigenous 
political order to circumvent most of the policies of the central government to their benefit. 
Instances of chiefs using their authority to influence voting patterns and numerous litigations 
by families and chiefs to reclaim ownership of landed properties vested in the central 
government are prevalent in Ghana. 
 
Further tensions between the state and cultural practices can be observed in the sustainability 
of the timber industry. This has historically been hampered by concession management and 
control practices which, under governmental bodies, have undermined the indigenous cultural 
traditions of Ghana where used timber concessions are left to replenish themselves naturally 
over a 25 year period. However, it being the sole prerogative of the government of Ghana under 
the constitution to grant natural resource rights, the replenishment and forage cycle for used 
timber concessions has changed. The following lines of testimony from a supervisor express 




“We are… using the 40-year forage cycle. It used to be 25 years and was changed to 
40 years. … You will not be permitted to come to the same place to do any harvest until 
40 years. The issue is that if you go in for harvesting, we have what we called natural 
shock, so we want the remaining to species to recover from this shock through natural 
process.  
 
Part of the above regulation and policy was enacted by the colonial administration in Ghana to 
control the felling of commercial trees. Accordingly, these two different “forage cycles” have 
been used for planning and monitoring strategies for the timber industry. 
 
To summarise our analysis of the external layers (Colignon and Covaleski, 1991; Weber 1958), 
the timber manufacturing industry is rooted in a multidimensional set of social processes that 
resists being confined to a single thematic framework. The laws and regulations associated 
with the timber industry reach deeply into historical, socio-economic, political and cultural 
developments and transformations that have taken place in Ghana over centuries. Organising 
timber product manufacture intertwines with customary (traditional) demands and with the 
institutional and structural context. Customary (traditional) factors pervade the organisation 
and the calculative practices of the case company and yet formal rationality is necessary to 
ensure means-end rational calculation (Kalberg, 1980), compliance with formal rules, laws and 
regulations, to allow business operations such as market access, sales and continuation of TUCs 
usage.  We now turn to the internal layer, where we observe Weber’s polymorphous concept 
of rationality and the formal and substantive concepts of rationality (Kalberg, 1980) provide 




7. Organisational context and calculative measures of organising and decision-making 
 
Based on field work evidence, this section analyses the organisational context (internal layer) 
and calculative measures of organising and decision-making in the TimberCo Ghana. We 
discuss, in turn: (i) raw materials acquisition; (ii) manufacture of timber products; (iii) labour 
control and native forms of resistance; and (iv) budgeting and budgetary control practice.  
 
7.1. Raw materials acquisition  
 
The actual manufacture of product begins with obtaining TUCs or concessions. The attainment 
of TUCs is underscored by a competitive system of public bidding for rights to harvest timber 
in an allocated area, on the basis of an annual timber rights fee for a term of forty years. 
However, the public bidding process for TUCs is noted to be fraught with corruption, politics 
and secrecy. Indeed, there have been cases of people with TUCs who did not have the 
prerequisite for bidding for timber concessions. TimberCo harvests timber from its legally 
allocated concession(s) and transports them to the company’s premises. However, this process 
may be curtailed if the companies conform to the dictates of chiefs and communal hierarchical 
relations – an indication that the authority of traditional chiefs in terms of logging and 
concessionary practices, has not diminished and this illustrates the presence of substantive 
rational (Weber, 1958, 1961) calculative measures for the TimberCo raw material acquisition 
and control. This is corroborated by the following remarks from a Production Manager 
associated with the timber industry:  
“Earlier, we were required to acquire concession to be involved in timber-related 
businesses and contracts. We now need to apply for the Timber Utilisation Contract at 
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the Forestry Commission of the Government of Ghana. First, we need to make an 
application and the commission will assess our application based on certain factors: 
for instance, the equipment we are using to do actual harvesting. We also need to pay 
stumpage fees during the contractual agreement. Previously, the stumpage fees, also 
called royalties, used to be 60/40, i.e. 60% for the forestry commission and 40% for the 
local authority, i.e. the chiefs, stool lands. The chiefs were not satisfied, and a new 
proportion has been agreed. Now the proportion is 40/60; the government takes 40% 
and the rest (60%) is allocated to the chiefs, stool lands.” 
 
Similarly, there are community influences on the logging activities of the timber company, as 
observed by one of the Production Managers: 
“Before you enter an area and take the timber you have to meet the local people, the 
assembly man, etc. and discuss… Even though the government has given you the permit 
to enter that area, you cannot do the felling and extraction without negotiations with 
the local people. The locals may say they want to build a school and you may negotiate 
with them by offering, for instance, 100 bags of cement and other items, such as roofing 
sheets. If they agree, then you would be allowed to enter the forest. [The] permit alone 
is therefore not enough.”  
 
What is inferred from this is the existence of traditionalism with regards to calculative measures 
linked to acquisitions of raw materials. The timber companies, including TimberCo, to some 
extent comply with the dictates of the concessions under the “landed” control measures of the 
respective chiefs. The subsumption and the sustenance of Ghana’s chieftaincy in the 
administration of forests, which is constitutionally reserved solely for the presidency, is 
evident. This also attests to the chieftancy’s historical superior legacy and its cultural strength 
in working hand in hand and in conflict with, an alien rational capitalist central governance and 
control system. For instance, a striking feature of the influences of chiefs during the colonial 
rule on the Gold Coast (which became Ghana after independence on 6th March 1957) emerged 
as the fact that three hundred “Native Courts” heard 83000 cases at law in the single year 1950-
1951 (Rathbone, 2001). The substantive rational (Weber, 1948, 1958, 1961) community 
relations thus play a part in logging and concessionary activities.  
 
Besides exploiting the concessions under its control, TimberCo can further acquire additional 
raw material (timber) in two ways. First, the company stands ready to purchase timber logs 
from other TUC holders who can transport their harvested logs to TimberCo’s premises 
(preferred option). Second, with permission from other concession owners, TimberCo can fell 
and transport their timber logs to its premises. These two types of raw material acquisition 
calculative measures are replete with varied forms of irregularities e.g., corruption and 
thievery. Nonetheless, these non-concessionary purchases and logging practices lead to a 
considerable reduction in TimberCo’s raw material costs as it eliminates the need to directly 
engage with local chiefs. The statement below from the Head of Logs depicts how the company 
has relied on non-concessionary purchases and logging practices while sourcing raw materials: 
 
“We also buy logs at our premises. There are people with concessions but without the 
facilities to process the logs further. What they do is, they do their own felling, bring 
the logs to our premises and we buy the logs from them.” 
 
TimberCo’s decision to engage in non-concessionary purchases and logging practices stemmed 
from the significant raw material costs associated with operating its own concessions. For 
instance, besides the elimination of the need to make payments to chiefs, TimberCo can also 
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reduce the cost associated with paying tips to timber truck drivers to meet delivery schedules.  
Accounts from interviewees suggest that, in organising raw materials, timber truck drivers 
intentionally delay the carriage process by blaming blockades, bad roads and the rainy season, 
to demand extra money from company management. For example, the rainy season mostly 
destroys large parts of the untarred forested road networks. However, a respondent from the 
log department noted that, whenever timber truck drivers are given tips, they are in the position 
to facilitate a ‘smooth’ carriage of timber logs to the company premises. Therefore, to 
circumvent some of these concessionary raw materials acquisition costs, timber companies are 
likely to be in tune with substantive rational non-concessionary forms of acquiring raw 
materials.  
 
The term of forty years for concession practice without proper afforestation measures has 
resulted in diminishing forest cover in Ghana. As such, timber companies face a decline in logs 
(raw materials) supply. Timber companies, therefore, rely on additional veneer purchases and 
supplies from the Ivory Coast, Ghana’s neighbouring country. By sourcing veneer from the 
Ivory Coast, companies grapple with substantial increases in raw material costs, such as 
translation loss (currency exchange) due to a weak local currency, transportation costs, border 
delays and charges, and bribes (to reduce delays at border checkpoints). 
 
 
7.2. Manufacture of timber products 
 
The case company specialises in plywood production. The entire manufacturing process takes 
place at the company’s premises. First, the number of transported logs to the company premises 
are recorded at the security section (i.e. the main entrance). From here, the logs are transferred 
to the logs section for further counting and cubic metre measurements. The cubic metre 
measurements are used to predict the number of finished plywood sheets that could be 
manufactured from the measured logs. Although cubic metre measurements are used as a 
predictive value, their relevance relies on additional pieces of information before they can be 
regarded as a confirmatory value. This is in line with calculating what may cause adverse 
variances in budgeted and actual finished products. The timber company largely attributes such 
shortfalls to theft, with other reasons for shortfall being intentional miscalculations, cubic metre 
measurement and sectional inefficiencies and log deficiencies. After cubic metre 
measurements, the logs are sent to the production department where the initial process is to cut 
the logs into preferred measurements for de-backing. Production work is semi-automated, with 
30 percent automation and 70 percent manual. Some of the production work linked to manual 
handling was de-backing of logs for further automated processing. As observed by one of the 
Production Managers: 
“Labour is cheap when you consider the fact that many people are willing to work with 
the tools known to them... The man is used to an axe, so when you tell him to use an 
axe, he doesn’t feel anything. That is normal to him.”  
 
In this process, workers use locally manufactured tools such as the axe and the cutlass. With 
automated de-backing, the logs are placed on a de-backer (machine) which de-backs the logs 
efficiently along its long blade in a rotary and even manner. However, it was evident that 
manual de-backing could result in considerable wastage of veneer due to the use of 
inappropriate local implements.  Additional production processes include using the de-backer 
to cut out veneer, placing the veneer into preferred shapes and then forwarding these to the 
pressing machine. Other follow-up processes include cutting the pressed veneer into preferred 




TimberCo’s production process highlights substantive rational (Weber, 1948, 1958, 1961) 
forms of practices, concealed within the Ghanaian traditional social and production relations, 
which may in part facilitate or hinder (Alawattage, 2011) the possibility for rational organising 
and decision-making practices. Timber production is measured and controlled by departmental 
heads who are linked to the production line. The production manager supervises the activities 
of departmental heads, whilst the managing director (owner) oversees the activities of all 
employees, epitomising Western-centric organisational control/managerial hierarchy. 
 
However, close examination of these organisational formations and control systems reveals 
novel traditional substantive rational production relations that interpenetrate the formal 
technical-rational (Weber, 1948, 1958, 1961) form of production practices. For instance, the 
position of departmental heads was based on seniority and generally reserved for elders. Such 
a gerontocratic idea of delegating authority to control organisational affairs is deeply ingrained 
in African societies (Douglas, 1999) as we discuss further in Section 7.3.  
 
Invariably, the managing director (owner) micro-manages all the departments within the 
company. For instance, even when the managing director (owner) is away from the company, 
he is to be reached for his final say during decision-making. It emerged during our interviews 
that there exists no trust between the owner and those who have been delegated to control all 
the respective departments. For example, a Head of Accounts/Finance Department remarked: 
 
“What I see is that the owner does not trust anyone when it comes to the money aspect. 
I cannot say what exactly it is, but my mind tells me that it could be that someone might 
have done something to him. Maybe he entrusted the financial aspect to the person and 
something might have happened. That is why he himself wants to do it”. 
 
Those the owner appoints to lead the departments were considered the lesser of the “evils”. 
The owner’s testimony revealed that his ingrained managerial stance characterised by a lack of 
trust in his department heads is as a result of the advice from elders. Evidence from the 
production process supports the managing director’s stance. For instance, some production 
employees misuse calculative measures through false cubic metre measurement and 
undercounting and subsequently connive with buyers to withhold the difference between the 
undercounted finished products and the actual finished products. Su Leen Tan and Woodward 
(2005) observed that trust is important in a variety of management accounting and hence, 
control applications. In the context of the researched company, control applications and 
calculative measures are in part underlined by lack of trust in the reliability of the appointed 
sectional managers or employees.  
 
The lack of trust is further evident in that when the owner was away a member of the owner’s 
family could sometimes come in and oversee the affairs of the company, as described by a 
supervisor in the accounts/finance department:  
“The owner’s brother comes here to see to the affairs of the company when the MD is 
away”. 
 
The owner’s brother is in a significant position in inheritance succession and this action is 
backed by the substantive rational (Weber, 1948, 1958, 1961) “pure native tenure system of 
inheritance” that is rooted in the provenance of the company.  As such, this particular family 
member wields some level of power in terms of succession in inheritance. Therefore, it is not 
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any mere member of the family who could walk into the company and control its affairs when 
the managing director (owner) is away.  
 
 
7.3 Labour control and native forms of resistance 
 
Culturally informed substantive rational (Weber, 1948, 1958, 1961) labour control in the 
company was evident in both the recruitment process and power dynamics in the workplace. 
The company’s stratified recruitment procedures and practices were in themselves forms of 
controlling the labour and its associated forms of resistance. This was evident in the manner in 
which the workers were recruited to perform the manufacturing work. For instance, some of 
the non-managerial employees who were interviewed had no formal contractual employment 
agreement and casual workers were noted to be in a similar situation. A formal contractual 
signed agreement was largely limited to those in management positions (i.e. heads and 
assistants of sections).  
 
The company’s employment measures and procedures take the following forms. Full-time 
permanent workers are first employed as casual workers after which recommendation to 
permanent employment is at the discretion of department heads. It was evident that no such 
recommendations were ever rejected by management. However, most of the workers who are 
permanently employed based on recommendations from department heads have no written 
contractual agreements with the company. Timber work recruitment was through established 
social relations based on department heads’ assessment of the casual workers’ past 
performance. In this regard, for most of the workers, becoming a permanent employee of the 
company was not in consonance with formalised recruitment measures and procedures linked 
to formal rational recruitment relations. Nonetheless, after recruitment, in the absence of 
written contractual agreements, their employment was, in part, formalised and acknowledged 
through the award of different wage scales. The other implication of this is that the power to 
control labour is vested in department heads. For instance, department heads were noted to 
have the power to hire or fire employees based on their substantive rational (Weber, 1948, 
1958, 1961) measures and judgments of the employees’ performance. This shows that the 
organisation’s recruitment tradition is partly in line with an agency perspective (Eldenburg and 
Krishnan, 2007) on the nature of employment contracts - which is to maximise organisational 
performance out of the situational problems. 
 
Figure 2 highlights the internal structure of the company for organising the manufacturing of 
plywood products. There are different departmental positions within the company. These 
positions constitute the dynamics of power relations and their associated magnitudes. In other 
words, the level of the hierarchy of authority or influence is represented by the following. The 
occupied space of each circled position represents the proximity of the department heads to the 
Managing Director (MD). The frequency of interaction between the MD and the department 
heads is represented by the dotted (intermittent interaction) and straight lines (frequent and/or 
continuous interaction).  
 
The selection of who becomes a department head is partly based on experience, age (i.e. the 
elderly) and propinquity (family connection, people of similar lineages from the owner’s 
village/hometown). It is evident from this study that the communal practices of delegating the 
hierarchy of responsibilities along the lines of age and seniority similarly underline the 
organising and calculative practices of the researched company. Elder status was a prerequisite 
in selecting someone to head or supervise departmental activities. In assessing the impact of 
20 
 
elders on the ways timber production is organised, it was noted that employees are unable to 
subvert the power and authority enshrined in the gerontocratic consciousness of the people. As 
such, due to respect for age (elders) in Ghanaian socio-cultural relations, people conform to the 
orders from elders. The following testimony of a general employee serves as an example:    
 “We do not have problems with our supervisors. We do what they instruct us to do. 
When we sometimes disagree with what they say, we consider the fact that they are 
elderly and experienced. Therefore, we do what they say.” 
 
Moreover, as identified by Adegbindin (2011), “gerontocracy” (the traditional and social 
significance of a person’s age) is the substantive rational (Weber, 1948, 1958, 1961), for the 
traditional African respect for the authority of elderly persons, through their experience, 
wisdom authority, leadership and knowledge of community affairs. The premium people place 
on the elderly in Africa, as seen among the employees in the researched company, is such that 
elderly clansmen wield the authority to curtail resistance. Furthermore, we found that the 
managing director (owner) relies on community leaders (elders) to meet with workers to advise 
them on the need to have a positive work ethic. One ex-employee, for example, shared his 
experience: 
“The MD even invited [an external community elder] to the company to have a meeting 
with us. [The Elder] advised us on the need to see the work as ours and we were asked 
to work harder to sustain the organisation’s performance.”  
 
Although the effect of this intervention on work output was not directly measured, it was a 
strong indication of the reliance on substantive rational (Weber, 1948, 1958, 1961) traditional 
social structures to condition labour, in creating economic value and wealth in Ghanaian timber 
companies.  
 
Therefore, the implication of age in Ghanaian social relations is that there is a practical 
implication of age as a calculative measure in the control of labour in timber manufacturing. 
Specifically, elders are used to organise product manufacture in a way that avoids resistance, 
thereby ensuring the smooth control of labour. The sustenance of labour control is further 
backed by the company’s internal position of allowing major departmental heads to recruit or 
sack employees. Thus, resistance to orders is curtailed as workers are deterred by the 
knowledge that they may be arbitrarily sacked by their department heads.  
 
A final means of controlling labour was in employing people the manager knows.  Many of the 
company’s workforce come from the owner’s village and some of them hold head of 
department positions, underlying the substantive rational (Weber, 1948, 1958, 1961) ‘native 
tenure system’. The following remark by a Managerial Respondent from the production 
department is underlined by the native proportionate share of the labour force: 
“Here, a large proportion of the workers comes from the owner’s hometown. 
Employment is through casual process. When someone is finally employed, we open a 
“file” for the person. However, the file does not say how much a worker is to be paid 
at the end of the month. But the skilled workers have their contract terms stated, 
including their salary for the year”. 
 







7.4. Budgeting and budgetary control practice 
 
We turn now to budgeting and budgetary control practices, illustrating the intertwining of a 
substantive rational perspective with financial control.  The company employs a form of 
partial-participatory budgeting. The budgeting process starts with the owner requiring periodic 
departmental reports from the heads of respective departments. These reports include the 
calculative measures such as log requisition records for the period, sales records, and units 
manufactured. After these reports are collected, the owner then discusses the reports with the 
heads of the key departments of the company: the accounts/sales office, the logs department, 
the production and marketing department and the security department. The discussion largely 
centres on the attainment and non-attainment of performance targets and associated reasons. 
The owner schedules separate meetings with each department head to have such discussions. 
This mode of engagement with department heads is illustrated by Figure 2, which typifies the 
direct engagement or interaction between the managing director (owner) and the heads of 
departments. During such meetings, the owner generally solicits views from the respective 
department heads in relation to performance measurement records. However, per respondents’ 
testimonies, these views are generally not acted upon. Thus, the judgments on the employee 
performances are based on the substantive rational (Weber, 1948, 1958, 1961) measures of the 
managing director (owner) rather than formal controls.  
 
The managing director plays a major role in controlling the operations of the company. For 
instance, each day, the managing director (owner) carries out three-hourly physical checks 
(audits) to calculate and measure departmental conformity to planned activities. Due to mistrust 
in his employees, he also routinely audits payments and receipts.  The following response from 
the managing director corroborates the above: 
“Each payment requires my approval. This allows me to have full details of all 
payments incurred. I do not delegate accounts keeping to other people; they may write 
anything and frame a story to veil the truth. What they think all the time is to find ways 
to steal money. For instance, if I send someone to put fuel into a vehicle, I also ask them 
to bring the receipt. Even with such strict scrutiny, I will not be surprised if the person 
partly fills the fuel tank and sells the remainder of the fuel to someone. So, I also need 
to check the vehicle sometimes”. 
 
In order to further ensure that the control mechanisms work, the owner relies on the information 
provided by his townspeople, community and elders (as seen in Figure 2). Many of the 
employees hail from the owner’s village and this highlights the importance of propinquity for 
the managing director (owner)’s organising and decision-making. The owner’s trust of his 
townspeople was presumably also related to the esteem in which he was held.  As a general 
employer stated, 
“The [MD’s townspeople] listen to him. I am not surprised, considering his wealth and 
influence.” 
 
The above is an indication of how trust, communality, family and gerontocracy shape planning 
and budgetary controls in TimberCo Ghana.  
 
8. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Employing Weber’s concepts of traditionalism and rationalities (Weber, 1948, 1958, 1961, 
1968) and Colignon and Covaleski’s (1991) three-layer analysis, we have in this paper 
demonstrated how the institutional and structural conditions embedded within the historically 
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evolved features of the Ghanaian society create substantive rational calculative measures of 
organising and decision-making practices in a quasi-formal organisation, TimberCo Ghana. 
That calculative practices play an important role in the functioning of organisations and society 
is covered extensively in prior work (Miller, 1994; Hopwood, 1983; Hopper et al, 2009; Guven-
Uslu et al., 2020; Lapsley et al., 2020). Previous accounting studies about calculative practices 
in developing countries have drawn on three different kinds of organisational settings. While 
the first strand of studies shows the application of calculative practices within formal structured 
organisations operating in traditional societies (Uddin, 2009; Uddin and Choudhury, 2008), 
informal settings such as rural and indigenous communities have become the focus of the 
second strand of studies (Gallhofer and Chew, 2000; Walker and Llewellyn, 2000; Jayasinghe 
and Wickramasinghe, 2007; Alawattage et al., 2017; Jayasinghe et al., 2020). The third strand 
of research pays attention to formalised and bureaucratic public sector entities in which rational 
calculative measures designed for the private sector, have been imposed at the behest of 
international organisations and development partners, as part of governance and accountability 
reforms (Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005; Van Helden and Uddin, 2016; Hopper et al., 
2017). The failure to enforce the calculative measures as intended, as well as their inability to 
engender the expected results, is evident in all such studies undertaken in different settings in 
developing countries.  
 
Rarely, however, have accounting studies investigated how rational calculative measures might 
operate in quasi-formal organisations, despite these being perhaps the most widespread forms 
of organisations in developing country contexts in general and in sub-Sahara in particular 
(Harriss, 1978; Hopper et al., 2009; Guha-Khasnobis et al., 2004). As has been discussed, these 
organisations blend the formal rational structures and requirements of private management 
practices with traditional cultures and social practices. The present study of a quasi-formal 
organisation is therefore a significant addition to our understanding of calculative measures 
operating in this kind of under-researched setting. The divisional structures of the researched 
organisation, TimberCo Ghana, attest to the presence of modern corporate apparatuses, but its 
practical work relations are instead in part organised and controlled under the form(s) of the 
hierarchisation that characterises Ghanaian socio-traditional contexts, adhering to the pure 
native tenure systems of inheritance and trust. This form of hierarchisation, which is central to 
traditional practices and widespread in Ghana, is largely neither formal nor formalised (e.g. 
Grier, 1981). 
 
Our key empirical contribution is to highlight how the technical legal ramifications and 
historical features of a developing country dominate the institutional and structural conditions 
in which formal organisations operate and which provide such organisations with a basis for 
undertaking rational decision-making. For instance, despite the influence of structural 
adjustment programmes and free market policies of the World Bank, the European Union and 
development partners, the researched company, TimberCo Ghana, faces restricted institutional 
and structural conditions due to the continuity of the legally controlled concessionary practices 
such as the timber utilisation contracts (TUCs). The historically established features of 
Ghanaian society, for instance, the pure native tenure system of inheritance, chieftaincy, 
royalty payments, familial hegemony, gerontocracy and trust, have made the institutional and 
structural conditions in which the timber industry operates much less relevant. In consequence, 
all formal rational decision-making and calculative mechanisms function according to 
substantive rationality (Weber, 1958, 1961, 1968). Within TimberCo Ghana, the local chief’s 
decision was central to the acquisition of raw materials (timber logs) and the control of timber 
resources. The labour control measures enforced were based on pure native tenure hegemony 
and underlying traditional power dynamics. Judgments on employee performances were made 
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following the community leaders’ (elders) recommendations rather than the formal measures. 
In summary, this evidence illustrates that the traditional cultures and social practices still play 
an influential role in the dynamics of organisational practices in Ghana, and by implication in 
other parts of sub-Saharan Africa (Ntiamoa-Baidu 1991; Appiah-Opoku and Hyma 1999; 
Chenhall, 2003). 
 
The notions of traditionalism and rationality we have employed in the study have enabled us 
to study the case organisation, TimberCo Ghana, within its historical, economic and political 
context. Thus, our theoretical contribution is to highlight the interplay between formal and 
substantive rationalities in traditionalism, where rational regulatory frameworks and practices 
are not enforceable. Indeed, the importance of a distinction between formal and substantive 
rationalities which engenders a better understanding of organisational practices is highlighted 
in prior work (Uddin, 2009; Jayasinghe et al., 2020; Uddin and Choudhury, 2008). We add to 
existing work by illustrating how the interplay of, and tensions between, formal and substantive 
rationalities play out in a formal organisation, TimberCo Ghana in our case, which transforms 
and functions as a quasi-formal organisation. The rational structures for organising and 
decision-making and calculative measures are features of TimberCo Ghana. However, 
traditionalism has led to the transformation of these features into a particular form of 
substantive rationality at the organisational level, thereby preserving and perpetuating the 
elements of Ghanaian society, such as chieftaincy, royalty payments, familial hegemony, 
gerontocracy and trust, in day-to-day practice.  
 
Finally, there are important implications for policymaking in traditional societies, which are 
still very much part of the culture of developing countries. Our case study clearly illustrates the 
need for Western-led organisational rationalities to adapt to traditional practices to ensure the 
optimal organisation of production processes, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Our findings 
also contrast with some previous studies of traditional societies. For instance, Hindess and Hirst 
(1977) discuss the historical trend in which capitalist production rationalities tend to subjugate 
traditional ones initially through ‘merchants’ capital, then through ‘commodity exports’ and 
finally through ‘imperialism’ (see also, Hopper et al., 2009). However, our case study leads us 
to suggest that different traditional practices can work alongside the capitalist or Western 
production rationalities. Furthermore, Boafo-Arthur (2003) notes that historical challenges in 
the form of colonial attempts to sidestep Ghana’s chieftaincy, and the attempts by the 
immediate post-independence governments to subjugate and divest chiefs from their economic 
strength through drastic laws, did not intimidate this traditional institution. Policy makers in 
sub-Saharan Africa and other developing countries, such as the World Bank, the IMF and the 
African Development Bank, need to understand this underlying institutional and structural 
(Weber, 1958, 1961) reality, should they wish to enforce better suited rational development 
policies for formal organisations operating in the traditional settings of developing countries. 
Given that each developing country is distinct (Van Helden and Uddin, 2016) and that 
traditionalism and rationality vary in different settings (Miller, 2001; Hopper et al., 2009), 
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2 Abbreviations: departmental employees(EMP); Head of Security (HOS); Head of Personnel (HOP); Head of 
Transport(HOT); Head of Logs (HOL); Head of Accounts(HOA); Production Manager(PM); Other 








































Table 1: Activity Structure of the Ghana Timber Industry 
 
Activity Area Number of Firms 
1991 1994 1998 2001 
Primary (Logging) 200 250 250 250 
Secondary     
Sawmilling 100 110 140 194 
Veneering 13 15 25 32 
Plymilling 9 9 14 14 
Tertiary     
Furniture(Medium/Large) 40 40 40 40 
Flooring 4 6 6 14 
Chip/Particle board 1 1 2 2 
Doors (Medium/large) 4 6 6 2 
Toys 2 4 4 6 
Profile Boards/ Mouldings   5 12 22 47 
 
















Table 2:  Timber business royalty payments  







The Forestry Commission 0% 50% 
The office of the Administrator of Stool 
Lands 10% 5% 
Of the remainder:   
The relevant Stool 22.50% 11.25% 
The relevant Traditional Authority 18% 9% 
The relevant District Assembly 49.50% 24.75% 
Notes: Annual rent per hectare per year is Ghana Cedis 0.12 (or USD 0.03) for forest reserves and Ghana Cedis 
0.1 (or USD 0.025) for off-forest areas. Stumpage fee is computed as tree volume multiplied by timber price 
multiplied by stumpage rate. Timber price is 35% of Free On Board value of equivalent air-dried lumber. 
Stumpage rate is determined by the Minister in consultation with the Forestry commission and Administrator of 
Stool Lands. 
 





Appendix 1: Table of interviewees 




Off) site Total 
Accounts/Finance Head of Accounts (HOA) 
1st Accounts Supervisor 
(ASI), 2nd  Accounts 
Supervisor (ASII) 
On 3 
Production Production Manager (PM) 
Boiler Supervisor (BS), 
Pillar Supervisor (PS), 
Dryer Supervisor (DS), 




Sales and Marketing  Head of Marketing and Sales (HMS) 
Marketing Supervisor I 
(MSI) On 2 
Logs Head of Logs (HOL)   On 1 
Transport  Head of Transport (HOT) Transport Supervisor I (TS1) On 2 
Forest Operations Head of Forest Operations (HFO)   On 1 
Carpentry  Head of Carpentry (HOC)   On 1 
Engineering 
Head of Mechanical 
(eHOM), Head of Electrical 
(HOE) 
Supervisor I (eMS) On 3 
Fuel   Supervisor (FS) On 1 
Other supervisors Other supervisors (OS)   On 6 
General employees General Employees (GE)   On 15 
Security Head of Security (HOS) Security Supervisor (SS) On 2 
Ex-employees Ex-employees (ExEMP)   Off 3 
Community Community (COMMTY)   Off 3 
Ministry of Lands and 
Natural Resources Director for Timber (DFT)   Off 1 
Regional Forestry Regional Director (RFD)   Off 1 
Faculty of Forest 
Resources  Lecturers (LI, LII)   Off 2  
Trade Union District (TU)   Off 3  





Appendix 2: Internal and external documents 
 
Documents Source 
Panel A: Internal documents 
Company Registration Certification 
Document Information board 
Logs requisition documents  Logs department 
Budget reports Production and Accounts department 
Production reports Production department 
Financial accounts Accounts/Finance department 
Organisational charts Information board 
Panel B: External documents 
Bank of Ghana (2004) Report on 
Ghana’s Timber Industry Bank of Ghana Research Department Document Vol.2 No.1  
Ministry of Lands and National 
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